Herbert Chapman at Arsenal 9: Arsenal wait for the right moment

Previously in this series:

I ended my last piece (part 8 linked above) with the note that Arsenal were advertising for a manager, having finally had enough of the failing and excuse-making Leslie Knighton.

We now need to add that at the same time Chapman himself knew he would have to move on from Huddersfield Town where he was having unimagined success, if he wanted both to explore his absolute potential as a manager and turn his recent achievements into continuing, long-term success. And the reason behind Chapman’s thinking was simple: he’d helped all of his clubs thus far (Northampton, Leeds City and now Huddersfield Town) to progress beyond their dreams.

But he knew enough about football, and the dependence of clubs on crowds as its prime source of revenue, to see that Huddersfield could go little further.

It should also be added that Chapman was also fully aware of the value of local rivalry between clubs. Leeds City, the club Chapman worked for before the first world war, was only 12 miles from Huddersfield Town, and both at Leeds, (now reborn as Leeds United after their financial scandal had seen Leeds City thrown out of the League) and now at Huddersfield he understood completely the value of such rivalry, for it kept local football in the news all the time, as well as encouraging people to support their local team.

Chapman also understood this value because of his time previously at Northampton Town where such rivalry did not exist. There were other clubs around Northampton at the time of course (Kettering Town FC for example, just 15 miles from Northampton were formed in 1872) but this was nothing like the intense rivalry that two clubs with significant support and playing just two or three miles apart in the same division could generate.

These then must have been some of the thoughts on Chapman’s mind when, despite having given Huddersfield Town their first taste of trophies (the FA Cup and two league championships in three successive seasons) he applied for the job of manager at Arsenal after their sacking of Leslie Knighton.

However in thinking of Chapman’s move from Huddersfield Town to Arsenal, what we still have to consider is the advertisement that Sir Henry Norris placed, announcing as it did that a new manager was required at Highbury. This advertisement appeared on 11 May 1925 immediately after Lesclie Knighton had been removed after another utterly disastrous season. For Arsenal, having finished 19th out of 22 in 1924 now went one worse and in 1925 missed relegation just one place.

Although it can’t be proven, it is more than likely that in sacking Knighton, Sir Henry knew exactly who he wanted as manager. But nevertheless, he went through the process, and his advert which then appeared in Athletics News that summer, with the text ending, “Gentlemen whose sole ability to build up a good side depends on the payment of heavy and exhorbitant [sic] transfer fees need not apply.”

Now the key word here (which I feel other commentators have often ignored) is “sole,” showing quite clearly not that Sir Henry didn’t want to pay out transfer money, but rather he wanted a manager who could do more than spend money. He wanted a tactician, which of course meant both having an idea of the tactics that would take the club up the league, but also the players who could make those tactics work. And that is what Chapman had done at Huddersfield – until it got to the point that if Huddersfield made an enquiry for a player, the player’s price then doubled.

No what Sir Henry wanted was a manager whose approach was based on tactical insight – and this clearly implied Herbert Chapman, the tactical genius of the day.

Indeed Sir Henry would of course have been fully aware that Chapman, in building his team based on clear team-wide and indeed club-wide tactics (rather than just occasionally bringing in one man as a replacement for another without any overall tactical approach, which is what Knighton always seemed to do) that this would mean Chapman would be spending money on transfers. Indeed spending money on transfers was what Chapman did – the point was, however, that he always did it with the tactics of the entire team in mind.

And thus the point of the word sole in the advertisement. “Gentlemen whose sole ability to build up a good side depends on the payment of heavy and exhorbitant transfer fees need not apply.”

So in effect the advertisement should be taken to show that Sir Henry was fully aware that developing the fulsome tactical approach that was totally beyond Knighton’s ability, would mean buying players. What he was against was buying the odd player here and there in the expectation that one player could solve the club’s problems.

One can also argue (although there is no written evidence to show this) that Norris had already explored the possibility of talking to Chapman – which at the time could be done, even without asking Huddersfield’s permission – although of course Sir Henry might well have done this. But either way, Sir Henry knew, having been effectively running Arsenal for 15 years, while also managing the nation’s movement in and out of conscription, that tactics were a central part of the solution to of any problem. And the fact that other commentators have not always seen this most likely reflects primarily on their desire only to see Sir Henry Norris as Arsenal’s owner, and not as the man who could see a problem and a solution at the same time. He had done this in developing housing in Fulham, which is how he made his fortune, and in rescuing Arsenal from extinction in 1910. Now he was going to do it again.

For just as there had been problems aplenty in the War Office when Mr Henry Norris, after the outbreak of war, volunteered for the army and was sent to Worthing to find out why there was apparently not a single man of conscriptable age in the town in 1914, so now there were most certainly plentiful problems in Arsenal’s team management at the time. Arsenal had only won 12 out of 42 league games in Knighton’s penultimate season, Only three teams had won fewer, and two of those were relegated. Worse Arsenal had lost 21 games that season, and only Middlesbrough had lost more.

Even worse from an entertainment point of view, only two teams had scored fewer goals than Arsenal (who were averaging under one goal a game), and only three teams had conceded more goals than Arsenal. In short everything that could be wrong with Arsenal was indeed wrong, and crowds (and hence money) were in decline.

Indeed in 1924/25 Arsenal’s top crowd all season had dropped to 29,502, down from around 60,000 at the start of Knighton’s reign (another factor he somehow forgot to note in his autobiography, although he did complain that Sir Henry had suggested that Knighton should play a certain player as he tended to draw in the crowds).

And we can understand why this was so as the poverty of Arsenal’s performances was such that if goal difference had been used at the time (instead of the harder to comprehend goal average) it would have been shown as -23: the worst goal difference in the League.

What all this meant was that not only were Arsenal in danger of relegation (which they missed by one point in 1923) but they were also not playing anything like the sort of football that fans wanted to see.

Yet Sir Henry did not dismiss Knighton at this time despite these awful match results and declining crowd numbers – instead in what at this distance in time looks like a truly extraordinary decision, he gave Knighton another season in charge.

Now this we might well see through the lens of history as a sign of a failure in decision-making by Sir Henry, and it is true that Sir Henry was known on occasion to show himself to be an extraordinarily loyal person (which was something that he had learned a lot about in his time at the Ministry of War).

But it is more likely that Sir Henry knew exactly who he wanted as manager of Arsenal, and knew that this man (obviously Herbert Chapman) could not yet be persuaded to give up his current post in Huddersfield.

And it is absolutely certain, that an educated and well-read a man as Chapman, would be fully aware of Sir Henry. Although today, because of the vindictive and self-serving autobiography of the managerial failure (and then unemployed and unemployable) Leslie Knighton, Lt Col Sir Henry Norris is known (where he is known) as a man of the most dubious qualities and character, there is no evidence that this was the case during his lifetime. Indeed quite the opposite. He was one of the very few administrative heroes of the war who spoke out in favour of better pay for the troops, war pensions for injured servicemen and votes for women (among other progressive causes).

But by Knighton’s final season at Arsenal, Sir Henry Norris knew what his next move was to be. Sir Henry wanted Chapman as manager, but Chapman was not quite yet ready to move, which explains why Knighton managed to retain his position as manager at Arsenal in 1924/25. And it is notable that in 1924/25 Knighton was allowed to to bring in just one player: Donald Cock, a 28 year old centre forward from Notts County, while to the north, Chapman won the league for the second year running.

Donald Cock made no impact and Knighton’s failure as a manager continued to be revealed as Norris prepared the ground for Chapman’s arrival. Indeed Cock was quickly moved on by Chapman (to Clapton Orient), once he arrived. In fact if any final proof had been needed that Knighton was not going to pull Arsenal out of the mire near the foot of the table, the notion that Donald Cock could make an impact was it. It really was the final straw.

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